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A Reconsideration of the Sworn Testimony Requirement:
Securing Truth in the Twentieth Century
Oath: In law, a solemn appeal to the Deity, made binding upon the
conscience by a penalty for perjury.
Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary

I.

INTRODUCTION

Upon observing the "swearing in" of a witness, 1 one might justifiably conclude that the procedure is a ritual without substance.
Often administered with pro form.a dispatch; the ancient institution
of the judicial oath2 may appear more a genuflection performed out
of habit than a ceremony sacred or significant to the law. 3 Such
perfunctoriness, at its extreme, is revealed in the occasional practice
of swearing witnesses en masse in order to expedite trial. 4
The superficial nature of the ritual, however, belies the deep
reverence in which the law purportedly holds the oath. As an 1828
court succinctly declared:
A man of the most exalted virtue, though judges and jurors
1. For the purposes of this Note, "witness" is defined to include any party or
third person who appears at a judicial proceeding to offer testimony as to a fact at
issue. In the present discussion, the special case of the infant witness has been
disregarded.
,
2. Unless otherwise indicated,' the term "oath" is used in its broad sense to
refer to both religious and nonreligious attestations offered by the witness as a
guarantee of the truthfulness of his testimony. The term "sworn" refers to the making of an oath by a witness.
3. See COUNCIL OF JurnCE, BRITISH SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CoMMN. OF
JurusTs, FALSE WITNESS § 68 (1973) [hereinafter cited as JurncB]. This report
states that the oath is "only too often regarded as a necessary formality, and rattled
off with little outward sign of sincerity or understanding of its implications." Id.
This same complaint was registered earlier in The Oath, 93 JurncE OF THE PEACE
670 ( 1929) (editorial): "One feels at present that the oath is not a sanction impelling a witness to be truthful, but simply a condition precedent to prosecuting him
for perjury if he lies too blatantly." For a discussion of the oath's role in modern
perjury prosecutions, see text at notes 123-35 infra.
4. One judge has asserted that this practice is "indecorous" and inconsistent with
the intended effects of the oath. See Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384, 388
(10th Cir.) (Murrah, J.~ dissenting), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 943 (1956), discussed
in note 9 infra. In Renfro v. Jackson County Juvenile Court, 369 S.W.2d 616, 622
(Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (dictum), the court expressed similar disapproval of group
swearing of witnesses in observing that the "dignity and solemnity of the oath should
not be eroded or jeopardized by loose trial methods."
On the other hand, Vaughn v. State, 236 Ala. 442, 183 So. 428 (1938), and State
v. Crea, 10 Idaho 88, 76 P. 1013 (1904), both upheld the mass swearing of witnesses.
Other than bald assertions that the practice occurred frequently, neither court offered
any precedent to support its holding.
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might place the most entire confidence in his declarations, Cl\nnot
be heard in a court of justice without oath. This is a universal
rule of the common law, sanctioned by the wisdom of ages, and
obligatory upon every court of justice, whose proceedings are according to the course of common law. 5
Grounded in the belief that the oath represents the "highest
possible security which men in general can give for the truth of their

statements," 6 the "sworn testimony rule" remains a maxim fundamentally unchanged since the early common law. 7 Illustrative of
modem statements of the rule is Federal Rule of Evidence 603,
which mandates that "[b]efore testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so." 8 Such homage to the ideal
5. Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66, 72 (1828).
6. R. WHITCOMBE, AN ENQUIRY INTO SoME OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE RELAT·
ING TO THE INCOMPETENCY OF WITNESSES 39 (London 1824) (emphasis original).
7. The most recent federal decision on unsworn testimony stated that a witness
who refuses to take the oath is "not a witness at all." United States v. Fiore, 443
F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1971), affd. on appeal after remand, 467 F.2d 86 (1972),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 984 (1973). The court noted Professor Wigmore's statement
that " 'for all testimonial statements made in court the oath is a requisite.' " 443
F.2d at 115 (quoting 6 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON TIIE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS OF COMMON LAw § 1824 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis original)).
The fundamental requirement of the testimonial oath "has been embedded in the
principles of the common law for hundreds of years." United States v. Moore, 217
F.2d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1954), revd. per curiam on other grounds, 348 U.S. 966
(1955). Accord, Ex parte Cunha, 123 Cal. App. 625, 11 P.2d 902, rehearing
denied, 123 Cal. App. 637, 18 P.2d 979, appeal denied, 123 Cal. App. 637 (1932);
Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day 51 (Conn. 1804); Haverly v. Clann, 196 So. 2d 38 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967); In re Godden, 158 Neb. 246, 63 N.W.2d 151 (1954); Ennen
v. Southwest Potash Co., 65 N.M. 307, 336 P.2d 1062 (1959); Jackson ex dem. Tuttle
v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820); State v. Ballou, 21 Ohio App. 2d 59,
254 N.E.2d 697 (1969); Howell v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 454, 176 S.W.2d 186
(1943); Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 632 (1846); 1 T. STARKIE, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON TIIE LAW OF EVIDENCE 80 (Boston 1826). See generally
PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE
1491-510 (10th ed. M. Argyle 1963) (Great Britain).
The term "testimony" has been defined to include only statements made under
oath. See, e.g., People v. Gilbert, 217 Cal. App. 2d 662, 666-67, 31 Cal. Rptr. 920,
923 (1963); State v. Schifsky, 243 Minn. 533, 539, 69 N.W.2d 89, 93 (1955).
8. FED. R. EVID. 603. Rule ti03, which became effective July 1, 1975, was
adopted without alteration from its initially proposed form. This circumstance suggests wide acceptance of the traditional rule. Compare the final version quoted
in text with the preliminary draft, 46 F.R.D. 161, 287 (1969), and the official Supreme Court version, 56 F.R.D. 183, 263 (1972).
The rule against admission of unswom testimony has been codified in many jurisdictions, including Alabama [ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 363-364 (1958)], Alaska [ALAS.
R. C!v. P. 43(g)(5)], Arkansas [ARK. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 603, ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 28-1001 (Supp. 1976)], California [CAL. Evm. CoDE § 710 (West 1966)],
District of Columbia [D.C. CODE § 14-lOl(a) (1973)], Louisiana [LA. CODE Civ.
PRO. ANN. art. 1633 (West 1961)], Ohio [OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.30 (Page
1953)], Pennsylvania [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 251 (Purdon 1958)], Tennessee
[fENN. CODE ANN.§ 24-301 (1956)], and Wisconsin [WIS. STAT,§ 906.03(1) (1975)].
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of the oath explains why unswom oral testimony has been admitted

as evidence in open court only under the most exceptional circumstances. 9
9. For example, unsworn oral testimony may be admitted when the court fails
to have a witness properly sworn prior to testimony and the testimony is received
without objection. See Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 943 (1956). In that case, two Spanish-speaking witnesses were
given an oath in English without benefit of translation. On appeal, the defendant
claimed that the witnesses' inability to understand the oath had rendered their testimony invalid. The court rejected the defendant's assertion, explaining that administration of the oath may be waived where the injured party fails to make a timely
objection to the omission. 231 F.2d at 387. Accord, In re Da Roza's Estate, 82
Cal. App. 550, 186 P.2d 725 (1947); Mettetal v. Hall, 288 Mich. 200, 284 N.W.
698 (1939); People ex rel. Niebuhr v. McAdoo, 184 N.Y. 304, 77 N.E. 260 (1906);
Trammell v. Mount, 68 Tex. 210, 4 S.W. 377 (1887). See FED. R. Evm. 103(a)
(1).

The waiver exception espoused in Wilcoxon has its roots in the common-law
maxim of qui tacet consentire videtur (he who is silent is presumed to have consented). See Cady v. Norton, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 236 (1833); Lawrence v. Houghton, 5 Johns. 129, 131 (N.Y. 1809). The maxim is premised on the notion that
otherwise incompetent evidence can be admitted if the parties so stipulate. Under this
analysis, a party who fails to insist on administration of the oath has implicitly consented to the admission of the unswom testimony and has waived any right to demand an oath.
The rationale for the rule is twofold. First, the defect could have been corrected
if a timely objection had been made. Second, absent the waiver doctrine, a party
might intentionally decline to object initially, preferring to raise the objection later
only if he received an unfavorable verdict. See Cady v. Norton, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.)
at 237.
The invocation of a general waiver doctrine in a situation typified by Wilcoxon,
however, clearly conflicts with a court's interest in insuring the truthfulness of testimony through the oath requirement. If the administration of the oath is taken seriously as a judicial concept, its omission could be interpreted as plain error and, therefore, cognizable by the court sua sponte. See Wilcoxon, 231 F.2d at 388; FED. R.
Evm. 103(d). Furthermore, omission of the oath may preclude prosecution of an
unsworn witness for perjurious testimony, since administration of the oath is an essential element of perjury in all jurisdictions and proof of oath administration is .
necessary for conviction. See, e.g., People v. Gilbert, 217 Cal. App. 662, 666, 31
Cal. Rptr. 920, 923 (1963). See notes 124-27 infra and accompanying text.
Another exception to the sworn testimony rule had existed with respect to criminal defendants. By the end of the nineteenth century, most jurisdictions had abolished a criminal defendant's disqualification from testifying on his own behalf. See
United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 938-39 n.6 (9th Cir. 1974); Popper, History and
Development of the Accused's Right To Testify, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 454 (1962).
Georgia, however, modified the traditional incompetency of the accused by enacting
an 1868 statute that permitted the defendant to make an unsworn statement to the
jury, though it denied him the right to testify under oath. 1868 Ga. Laws 19. The
United States Supreme Court struck down this statute in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365
U.S. 570 (1960), holding that a criminal defendant was fully capable of appearing
as his own witness. In response to Ferguson, the Georgia Legislature amended the
invalidated statute to provide that, as an alternative to the unsworn statement, the
prisoner could choose to testify under oath. 1962 Ga. Laws 133, 135; see 16 MERCER
L. REv. 441 (1965). Commentators denounced the retention of the "unsworn statement option" as archaic. See, e.g., 23 MERCER L. REV. 375 (1972). Bowing to this
criticism, the Georgia Legislature in 1973 deleted any reference to the unsworn statement in its statutes, thus effectively abolishing the practice. See GA. CODE ANN. §
38-415 (1974).
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The purpose of this Note is relatively modest-to explore
whether the traditional uncritical confidence placed in the sworn
nature of testimony is justified in light of twentieth-century practice.
As such, its intention is not to propose legal reforms, but rather to
invite its readers to pause and reconsider a ritual too often taken
for granted by the legal profession. To this end, this Note will examine the following factors influencing the character of the oath
in modern times: the common-law and religious roots of the oath,
the rise of nonreligious affirmation within the last century, the relationship between the oath and the law of contempts, the current
de minimis standard for witness competency, and, finally, the relation of the sworn testimony rule to the law of perjury.
II.

SECURITY FOR THE TRUTH

A.

The Common-Law Oath

The requirement that witnesses be sworn has its foundation in the
usually unexpressed assumption that all testimony is inherently corrupt10 due to the self-interest11 or indifference12 of the witness. The
law has never relied solely upon native honesty in its search for the
truth; 13 rather, from the beginning it has sought through the oath
to gain security against the vicissitudes of human nature. 14
The common-law judicial oath was rooted in the ancient concept
of "judicium dei"-clivine judgment-shared by the early forms of
proof in Anglo-Saxon law. 15 By this "appeal to supernatural
sanctions,"16 one who swore falsely could expect the swift and certain vengence of an omnipotent god bound to intervene on the side
A defendant's unsworn statement is still permitted by statute in Great Britain.
Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Viet., c. 36, § l(h). The statute's usefulness
bas also been tbe subject of much critical discussion. See, e.g., JusncE, supra note
3, ,r 70.
10. It ha~ been stated that the oath is necessary "for the purity and truth of oral
evidence." 1 s. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE I..A.w OF EVIDENCE § 328 (Boston
1842).
11. See, e.g., White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect upon the
Competency of Witnesses, 42 AM. L. REG. 373, 373-74 (1903).
12. See, e.g., R. WlnTCOMBE, supra note 6, at 6.
13. See Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66 (1828), quoted in text at note S supra
and discussed in note 45 infra.
14. See, e.g., White, supra note 11, at 374-86.
15. These early forms of proof included compurgation, trial by ordeal, and trial
by battle. See Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, in 1 SELEcr EsSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 88, 92-94 (1907); Thayer, The Older
Modes of Trial, in 2 SELECT EsSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367
(1908). See generally H. LEA, SUPERSTmoN AND FORCE (1892).
16. Pollock, supra note 15, at 92.
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of truth. 17 Wigmore has noted that, as a result of this apprehension,
"[i]t was not a matter of weighing the credibility of a sworn statement; the thought was rather that such an appeal could not be made
with impunity."18 Thus, ~ sworn witness who remained unharmed
after testifying was presumed to have been adjudged by God to have
spoken the truth. 19
As the law entered a less superstitious age, the effect of the oath
on the "mind and emotions"20 of the witness replaced the notion of
immediate divine intervention as security for the truth. To obtain
this guarantee, the law expected that in taking the oath the witness
would form an ironclad covenant with his god, pledging his eternal
soul as security for his promise to testify truthfully. 21 Consequent
to this doctrine was an underlying requirement that the witness believe
in a supreme being who would punish him for breaching the covenant
by swearing falsely. 22 Under this system, persons who were deemed
to lack the requisite religious belief could not be sworn, and thus they
could not testify. 23 As one court reasoned, "[i]t would indeed seem
11. See H. LEA, supra note 15, at 371-75; White, supra note 11, at 416-19.
18. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN Th!ALS AT COMMON LAW § 1816 (rev. ed. J.
Chadbourn 1976).
19. Id.
20. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177, 182 (1948).
21. The purpose of the oath is not to call the attention of God to the witness,
but the attention of the witness to God; not to call upon him to punish the falseswearer, but on the witness to remember that he will assuredly do so. By thus
laying hold of the conscience of the witness, and appealing to his sense of accountability, the law best insures the utterance of truth.
Clinton v. State, 33 Ohio St. 27, 33 (1877). Coke had declared two centuries earlier
that, in its proper state, the conscience of a swom witness should be "always gnawing
and vexing him." 4 E. CoKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 278 (London
1797).
In Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. (3 Gratt) 602, 608 (1846), the court stated
that all who believe in God believe that through the oath they "incur a higher obligation" than by a simple promise or "asseveration."
22. Starkie thought that the oath was "a solemn invocation of the vengence of
the Deity upon the witness if he do [sic] not declare the whole truth, as far as he
knows it." T. STARKIE, supra note 7, at 79-80. Coke had maintained that "[an]
oath ought to be accompanied with the fear of God." 4 E. COKE, supra note 21, at
279. This doctrine can be distinguished from the more primitive notion of the "judicium dei." In both approaches a witness' fear ,of the Deity's wrath would undoubtedly provide strong impetus for avoiding perjury. The early oath, however, sought
a physical manifestation of divine interference as a sure gauge of testimonial truth.
Under the more modem theory, "[t]he administration of an oath supposes, that a
moral and religious accountability is felt to a Supreme Being, and is the sanction
which the law requires upon the conscience of a person, before it admits [the witness] to testify." Wakefield v. Ross, 28 F. Cas. 1347, 1347 n.2 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827)
(No. 17,050). Only by such an oath was it said that "truth is enjoined, and falsehood punished." R. WarrcoMBE, supra note 6, at 7.
23. A corollary to this concern for the religious beliefs of the witness was the
opinion that civil penalties for perjury alone were a totally inadequate sanction to ensure truthful testimony. See Central Military Tract R.R. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541,
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absurd, to administer to a witness an oath, containing a solemn
appeal for the truth of his testimony, to a being in whose existence
he has no belief."24
Under early English law, only Christians and, by most accounts,
Jews were deemed to possess the belief necessary to be sworn as
witnesses. 25 It was not until Omichund v. Barker26 was decided in
1744 that the class of acceptable religious followings for the purposes
of the oath was expanded. In Omichund, an East Indian petitioned
the Court of Chancery in England for relief against an English merchant with whom he had done business in Calcutta. Chancery sent
a special commission to India to examine the matter firsthand, 27 and
there the commission deposed several "Gentoos," who were sworn
552-53 (1856); Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 25, 29 (1856) (dictum); Com•
monwealth v. Winnemore, 2 Brewst. 378, 381 (Pa. 1867) (dictum).
The traditional reliance upon the religious nature of the oath cannot be overemphasized. The need for its special influence was often expressed, most notably by
President Washington in his farewell address:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion
and morality are indispensable supports. . . . A volume could not trace atl
their connections with private & public felicity.-Let it simply be asked where
is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of
Justice?
V. PALTSITS, WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL .ADDRESS 151 (1935).
24. Thurston v. Whitney, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 104, 110 (1848).
25. The concept that only Christians could be properly sworn is attributable to
Coke. Coke defined the oath in exclusively Christian terms, stating that it was "an
affirmation or denial! by any Christian . . . calling Almighty God to witnesse, that
his testimony is true." 3 E. CoKE, supra note 21, at 165. Coke made the same point
in another work, where he categorically stated that, if a person were an infidel (a
term he took to mean atl non-Christians), he could not be a witness. 2 E. COKE,
Tue FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LA.ws OF ENGLAND § 6.b (19th ed. C.
Butler 1832). This conservative stance was further fortified by Coke's well-known
comment in Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 397 (K.B. 1609), that "[a]l1 infidels
are in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies . . . for between them, as with the
devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual hostility, and can
be no peace."
Apparently no American courts endorsed this exclusion of non-Christians, and
several American tribunals expressly condemned the practice. See, e.g., Central
Military Tract R.R. v. Rockafellow, ·11 Ill. 541, 552 (1856) ("a rule as narrow,
bigoted and inhuman as the spirit of fanatical intolerance and persecution which disgraced his age and country"); Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 25, 27 (1856)
("narrow-minded, illiberal, bigotted, and unsound").
Despite Coke's proclamations, allowing Jewish persons to be witnesses was a customary practice of the period. 4 w. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN c. 46, § 153 (7th ed. London 1795). See Robeley v. Langston, 84 Eng.
Rep. 196 (K.B. 1607) (per curiam), in which the court held that Jews sworn on
the Old Testament had sufficiently invoked the necessary obligations and sanctions
required by the law. Both the Old and New Testaments were considered the one
"word of God," and hence an oath taken on either was thought to be equally addressed to the Almighty. See 4 W. HAWKINS, supra, § 148.
26. 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (Ch. 1744).
27. 125 Eng. Rep. at 1310-11. The order was issued in Ramkissenseat v. Barker,
26 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1739).
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according to the ceremonies of their own religion. 28 The defendant
objected to the subsequent introduction of these depositions in the
principal case, claiming that the "infidels" could not be admitted as
witnesses because their insensibility to the sanctions of the oath
rendered their testimony unworthy. In his opinion for the court,
Lord Chief Justice Willes declared that any person who believed
in a god and in the solemn obligation of an oath was competent
to testify once he had been sworn in whatever manner his conscience and religious convictions would find binding. 29 Rejecting
Coke's "impolitic" decree that all non-Christians30 were per se incompetent, Lord Willes stated that the capacity to be bound by an
oath was not exclusive to those of the Christian faith. Although the
form of oath might vary, "still the substance is the same, which is
that God in all of them is called upon as a witness to the truth of
what we say."31 As a crucial limitation on its decision, however,
the court carefully retained the notion that witnesses had to believe in some supreme being who would "punish them if they swore
falsely." 32 The court stressed that persons who "do not think [God]
will either award or punish them in this world or in the next, cannot
be witnesses in any case or under any circumstances, for this plain
reason, because an oath cannot possibly by [sic] any tie or obligation
upon them." 33
The broader competency of non-Christians established by
Omichund was settled doctrine in England by the last half of the
eighteenth century. 34 In The King v. Taylor, 35 the court interpreted
Omichund to mean that the proper inquiry of a witness was whether
he believed in God and in future rewards or punishments, not
whether he believed in "Jesus Christ" or the "Holy Gospels." 36
And a "Mahometan" was permitted to be sworn in The King v

28. The customary English oath was "read and interpreted to" each witness, who
thereafter assented by touching the hand or foot of a Brahmin priest. 125 Eng. Rep.
at 1317.
29. "[N]othing but the belief of a God and that he will reward and punish us
according to our deserts is necessary to qualify a man to take the oath." 125 Eng.
Rep. at 1313-14. Lord Willes did distinguish in such a case between a witness' competency and his credibility, thereby suggesting that a jury could give less credence
to the testimony of an infidel than to that of a Christian. 125 Eng. Rep. at 1315.
30. For a discussion of Coke's views, see note 25 supra.
31. 125 Eng. Rep. at 1314.
32. 125 Eng. Rep. at 1315. See text at notes 20-24 supra.
33. 125 Eng. Rep. at 1315.
34. See 4 W. HAWXINs, supra note 25, § 149 n.(a).
35. 170 Eng. Rep. 62 (K.B. 1790).
36. This interpretation of Omichund was the source of considerable dispute. See
notes 39-50 infra and accompanying text,
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Morgan, 37 where the witness placed his right hand upon the Koran
and slowly brought his forehead down to touch the book.
The policy of swearing a witness by the peculiar method most
binding upon his conscience eventually led to judicial approval of
rather unusual ,and even bizarre oaths. In this odd class, the ingenious Chinesd "chicken oath" reigns supreme. To begin the ritual,
a solemn declaration was written in Chinese on yellow paper, to which
the witness signed his name twice. Then,
[a] cock having been procured, the Court and jury adjourned to a
convenient place outside the building where the full ceremony of
administering the oath was performed, as follows: By a block of
wood, punk sticks, not less than three, and a pair of Chinese candles
were stuck in the ground and lighted. The oath was then read out
loud by the witness, after which he wrapped it in Joss-paper as
used in religious ceremonies, then laid the cock on the block and
chopped its head off, and then set fire to the oath from the candles
and held it until it was consumed. 38
American courts adopted the basic Omichund doctrine, 30 but
37. 168 Eng. Rep. 129 (Old Bailey 1765). Special oaths were also administered
to witnesses of other persuasions under the Omichund doctrine. See, e.g., Mee v.
Reid, 170 Eng. Rep. 69 (K.B. 1790) (Scottish witness allowed to testify even though
he did not "kiss the book," a deviation from British custom); Mildrone's Case, 168
Eng. Rep. 308 (Old Bailey 1786-) (same). See the case compilations in 12 J. ATKIN,
nm ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COURT FORMS AND PRECEDENTS IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 11320 (1948); D. BOLAND & B. SAYER, OATHS AND AFFIRMATIONS, Forms 22-26 (1953);
Lovekin, The Whole Truth, 3 CRIM. LQ. 227 (1960).
38. Rex v. Ah Wooey, 9 B.C. 569, 510 (1902). Wigmore states that such cere•
monies were not customary to Chinese persons in general. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 18, § 1818 n.3. Such illustrations are intended only to mark the unclear bounda•
ries of the Omichund rule. Compare the unusual case of Regina v. Entrehman, 174
Eng. Rep. 493 (Central Criminal Court 1842), where a Chinese witness took his oath
by kneeling in the witness box and breaking a saucer on its brass railing. He then
solemnly exclaimed that, should he not speak the truth, his soul would likewise
shatter. In addition to the "chicken" and "saucer" oaths, non-Christian Chinese
witnesses also apparently had the option of the "candle" oath. That ceremony
consisted of placing a lighted candle on the ledge of the witness box. The witness
snuffed out the candle while entreating that, if he committed perjury, "May my soul
be extinguished as I quench this flame." 12 J. ATKIN, supra note 37, at 116.
Administration of the chicken oath has been reported in only one American case.
Bow v. People, 160 Ill. 438, 43 N.E. 593 (1896). See State v. Chyo Chiagk, 92 Mo.
395, 4 S.W. 704 (1887) (failure to swear Chinese witness by "joss-stick" burning held
to be error); Rex v. Lee Tuck, 2 W.W.R. 605, 613 (Alta. 1912) (perjury conviction
quashed because the Chinese Christian defendant was not sworn with the standard
Christian oath).
39. "The pure principle of the common law is, that oaths are to be administered
to all persons according to their own opinions, and as it most affects their consciences." Gill v. Caldwell, 1 Ill. 53, 53-54, 1 Breese 28 (1822). Accord, Curtiss v.
Strong, 4 Day 51 (Conn. 1809); Commonwealth v. Bacheler (Boston Mun. Ct.
1829), reported in 4 AM. JURIST & L. 79, 80-81 n.(a) (1830).
In The Merrimac, 17 F. Cas. 120 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 9,474), a Chinese
witness was held competent to take the oath despite his inability to identify the Bible
upon which he was sworn. The witness had declared that he knew the court would
punish him for an untruth, and, when asked about punishment in the hereafter, he
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demonstrated uncertainty about the exact nature of belief it required. The doubt arose because two reports were made of the
Omichund opinion, each with a different version of the belief
standard. The report cited above, 40 written by Lord Willes himself,
had set the standard as belief in punishment "either . . . in this
world or in the next." 41 Another report, published some years
earlier by one Atkyns, had declared instead that the witness must
fear the existence of "future rewards and punishments in the other
world." 42 The earlier appearance of the Atkyns version compounded the confusion, as it was the explication initially relied upon
by several American courts. 43 The court in Atwood v. Welton, 44 for
example, barred one Hezekiah Scott from the witness stand because
he had asserted that all dead men enjoy complete happiness. 45
On the other hand, consistent with the Willes Report, 46 several
courts during the period declared that a witness' belief or disbelief
in future spiritual rewards or punishments affected only his credibilhad answered that if he did not tell the truth he would "go down there." Cf. T.
STARKIE, supra note 7, at 80-81 ("all persons may be sworn as witnesses who believe
in the existence of God, in the future state of rewards and punishments, and in the
obligation of an oath, that is, who believe that Divine punishment will be the consequence of perjury").
40. See note 26 supra.
41. Willes 538, 549, 125 £ng. Rep. at 1315 (emphasis added).
42. Omychund [sic] v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 45, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 31 (Ch. 1744)
(emphasis added). The Atkyns report was published in 1765, while the Willes version was not published until 1800. Atkyns' error was the subject of extended
treatment in People v. Matteson (Ct. of Oyer and Terminer, Otsego County 1824)
(unreported opinion of Walworth, J.), reprinted in the report of Butts v. Swartwood,
2 Cow. 431, 432 n.(a) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
43. See note 45 infra.
44. 7 Conn. 66 (1828).
45. One judge issued a blistering dissent asserting that Omichund excluded only
atheists and other persons with no belief in divine punishment. 7 Conn. at 79
(Peters, J., dissenting). A result similar to that in Atwood was reached in Wakefield
v. Ross, 28 F. Cas. 1346 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 17,050). In Wakefield, the court
held that the requisite testimonial accountability sought by administration of the oath
was absent if the potential witness had no belief in a future state.
In Jackson ex dem. Tuttle v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820)
(emphasis added), the court stated:
[N]o testimony is entitled to credit, unless delivered under the solemnity of an
oath, which comes home to the conscience of the witness, and will create a tie
arising from his belief that false· swearing would expose him to punishment in
the life to come. On this great principle rest all our institutions, and especially
the distribution of justice between man and man.
This.passage came under fire in an essay published a short time later: "A house
divided against itself cannot stand; and all our institutions stand no better chance,
which depend on the controverted and fluctuating opinions of man about what is or
is to happen in another world." T. HER1TELL, THE DEMURRER 120 (1828) (emphasis
original).
46. See note 29 supra.
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ity, not his competency. 47 By the middle of the nineteenth century,
the majority of courts that had addressed the question favored this
less restrictive position, emphasizing that a basic belief in "God and
his Providence" was sufficient for administration of the oath. 48 However, despite this disagreement over whether a belief in punishment
and rewards after death was required under the Omichund doctrine,
all authorities agreed that only persons who believed in some form of
higher being could be sworn. 49 By definition a religious oath could
not bind a nonbeliever, and one's "own notions of honor, veracity,
and amenability to criminal justice"110 were thought no substitute for
the fear of divine wrath. Such reasoning mandated the exclusion
of a witness in United States v. Lee,r,1 because he had declared that
"Nature'' was God and that "when a man died, he died like a tree,
and was resolved into his natural elements."
B.

Affirmation

The common-law ban against receiving testimony from persons
whose skepticism was irreconcilable with the oath was not the only
source of difficulty created by the traditional sworn testimony rule.
41. See, e.g., Hunscom v. Hunscom, 15 Mass. 184 (1818). In People v. Matteson
(Ct. of Oyer and Terminer, Otsego County 1824) (unreported manuscript of Walworth, J.) reprinted in the report of Butts v. Swartwood, 2 Cow. 431, 432 n.(a)
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823), the same conclusion was reached, and the court announced
that the "strength" of the witness' convictio]!S was a matter for the jury. This rationale was first applied in a federal court in Rutherford v. Moore, 21 F. Cas. 96
(C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 12;174).
48. See, e.g., Blocker v. Burness, 2 Ala. 354 (1841); Central Military Tract R.R. v.
Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541, 552 (1856); Smith v. Coffin, 18 Me. 157, 160 (1841); Free
v. Buckingham, 59 N.H. 219 (1879); Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 25, 27-31
(1856); Brock v. Milligan, 10 Ohio 121 (1840); Cubbison v. M'Creary, 2 Watts &
Serg. 262 (Pa. 1841); Jones v. Harris, 32 S.C.L (1 Strob.) 160 (1846); Bennett v.
State, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 411 (1852). See United States v. Kennedy, 26 F. Cas.
761 (C.C.D. III. 1843) (No. 15,524) (dictum). The conclusion that a ma;ority
of courts had articulated such a position by this period may be subject to some
imprecision, given the possibilities that some decisions may have remained undigested or unreported or that the courts of several states may not have had an appropriate opportunity to declare themselves on the matter. Majority status for the less
restrictive rule at mid-century seems nonetheless evident from those cases discoverable by conventional research techniques. Cf. 1 T. STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE
ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 29, n.1 (10th ed. 1876) (majority of cases cited support
the less restrictive rule).
49. See, e.g., Anonymous, 1 Haz. U.S. Reg. (1839) 87 (W.D. Pa.) (now unreported opinion), noted in 1 F. Cas. 999 (Case No. 446); Beardsley v. Foot, 2 Root
399 (Conn. 17%); Norton v. Ladd, 4 N.H. 444 (1828); Jackson ex dem. Tuttle v.
Gridley, 18 Johns. 98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820); State v. Cooper, 2 Tenn. 96, 2 Overt.
487 (1807); Scott v. Hooper, 14 Vt. 535 (1842). See l S. GREENLEAF, supra note
10, § 368; 4 W. HAWKINS, supra note 25, § 154.
50. Central Military Tract R.R. v. Rockafellow, 17 III. 541, 554 (1856).
51. 26 F. Cas. 908, 909 (C.C.D.C. 1834) (No. 15,586).
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Members of certain Christian sects, 52 notably the Quakers, refused
to be sworn on the ground that the common-law act of swearing was
blasphemous. 53 In such instances the witness firmly believed in
divine accountability: it was precisely the strength of that apprehension that prevented him from taking the customary oath. In order
to permit persons of such religious convictions to be "sworn" within
the confines of their faith, the law developed the affirmation-a formal declaration, without direct reference to divine authority, that the
witness recognizes and will uphold his full obligation to tell the
truth. 54
In England, affirmation of witnesses was first established in 1696
by statute, 55 in the wake of religious toleration that followed the ascent of William and Mary to the throne. That legislation, limited
to Quakers, granted the affirmation the legal force of the oath for
52. In addition to the Quakers, or Society of Friends, these sects included the
Separatists and the Moravians. Each group was eventually benefited by legislation
which extended the affirmation privilege. See notes 55-58 infra.
53. The belief stemmed in part from the Biblical admonitions in Matt. 5:34:
"Swear not at all," and James 5:12: "But above all things, my brethren, swear not,
neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath . . . ." See J.
BENTHAM, SWEAR NoT AT ALL 1, 71-75 (London 1817) (pamphlet). One contemporary writer distinguished on doctrinal grounds the three groups involved-the
Quakers, the Separatists, and the Moravians--by declaring the Quakers to be the most
extreme in their repugnance to swearing the customary oath. J. TYLER, OATHS 912, 239-42 (1834). Compare J. BENTHAM, supra at 26-27.
54. A Massachusetts statute, for example, permitted Quakers to make the following affirmation: "I, A.B., do solemnly and sincerely affirm and declare under the
pains and penalties of perjury." 1743-1744 Mass. Acts ch. 20, § 1.
55. An act that the solemn affirmation and declaration of the people called Quakers, shall be accepted instead of an oath in the usual form, 1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c.
34. The act extended affirmation to "all courts of justice and other places where
by law an oath is required within this kingdom of England." ,(emphasis original).
Notably, at least one colonial assembly-New York-preceded Parliament by enacting similar legislation in 1691. See An Act to ease People that are scrupulous in
Swearing, 1691, 3 Will. ~. reprinted in Acrs OF AssEMBLY PASSED IN THE PROVINCE
OF NEW Yoruc 10 (New York 1726) (Bradford). Pennsylvania adopted a broad affirmation statute even earlier (1682) as one of a series of laws agreed upon by William Penn and his followers in England prior to settlement of the colony. See I Colonial Records 40 (Act of May 5, 1682) (Pennsylvania). The Pennsylvania statute,
unlike others, mandated simple affirmation for all witnesses. See The Law about the
Manner of giving Evidence, and against such as Lye in Conversation, Act of May
31, 1693 (Pennsylvania), and a similar law passed in 1696, in I Colonial Records
50 (Act of November 7, 1696) (Pennsylvania).
The English parliamentary statute of 1696 established the form of the affirmation
as: "I A.B. do declare in the presence of Almighty God, the witness of the truth
of what I say." 1 & 8 Will. 3, c. 34, § 1 (emphasis original). This form actually
violated the Quaker strictures against swearing, but was nonetheless used in court on
at least one occasion. See Rex v. Maurice, 90 Eng. Rep. 859 (K.B. 1698). To
remedy the error, Parliament in 1721 enacted a new affirmation statute with a form
that made no references to God. See An act for granting the people called Quakers,
such forms of affirmation or declaration, as may remove the difficulties which many
of them lie under, 1721, 8 Geo. 1, c. 6.
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"all intents and purposes." 56 Parliament subsequently extended the

privilege to certain other denominations, 57 and during this period a
series of colonial legislative acts preserved the affirmation privilege
for American Quakers and some others. 58 By 1789, the practice
appears to have been commonly accepted. 59
56. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 34, § 1. However, it is significant that the statute continued
to bar Quakers from giving evidence "in any criminal cause." 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 34,
§ 6, retained by reference, An act for making perpetual an act of the seventh and
eighth years of the reign of his late majesty King William the Third . . . , 1714,
1 Geo. 1, st. 2, c. 6, § 1, retained by virtue of the saving clause in 8 Geo 1, c. 6,
§ 3. See Atcheson v. Everitt, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142 (K.B. 1775) (discussion of per•
tinent legislative history).
A later act extending the affirmation to members of the Moravian sect, discussed
in note 57 infra, contained a similar provision. The "criminal cause" restriction was
removed by statute in 1828. See An Act for amending the Law of Evidence in cer•
tain Cases, 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 32, § 1. See also The Quakers and Moravians Act,
1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 49.
51. In 1749, Parliament extended the privilege of affirmation to witnesses of the
Moravian (United Brethren) sect in order to induce their immigration to the
American colonies. See An act for encouraging the people known by the name of
Unitas Fratrum or United Brethren, to settle in his Majesty's colonies in America,
1749, 22 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 1. The Separatist sect was granted similar privileges some•
what later. See An Act to allow the People called Separatists to make a solemn Af•
firmation and Declaration instead of an Oath, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 82. See also
An Act for improving the Administration of Criminal Justice in the East Indies
1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 74, § 36 (permitting affirmation by Quakers, Moravians, and "na•
lives" in India).
58. E.g., An Act to ease People that are Scrupulous in Swearing, 1718, 4 Geo. 1
(N.H. Assembly), reprinted in 1702-1725 N.H. Laws 263 (Province Period, Vol. 2);
An Act that the solemn Affirmation and Declaration of the People called Quakers
should be accepted instead of an Oath in the usual form .•. , 1713-14, 12 & 13 Anne,
c. 54 (NJ. Assembly) (Allinson), supplemented by An Act prescribing the Forms
of Declaration of Fidelity, the Effect of the Abjuration Oath and Affirmation • . • ,
1727-1728, 1 Geo. 2, c. 124, § 1 (N.J. Assembly) (Allinson); An Act for granting to
the People called Quakers . . . the same Privileges Benefits and Indulgences . • . ,
1734, 8 Geo. 2, c. 603 (N.Y. Assembly); A Supplementary Act to a Law about the
Manner of giving Evidence, 1711-1712, 10 & 11 Anne, c. 7 (Pa. Assembly), reprinted
in THE LAWS OF TilE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA 160-61 (Phila. 1714) (Bradford);
An Act prescribing the Forms of Declaration of Fidelity, Adjuration and Affirmation,
1725, 11 Geo. 1, c. 282 (Pa. Assembly); An Act for establishing the General Court,
and for regulating and settling the Proceedings therein, 1705, 4 Anne, c. 19, § 31 (Va.
Gen. Assembly), reprinted in A CoLLECTION OF ALL TilB ACTS OF ASSEMBLY Now
IN FORCE, IN TilB CoLONY OF VmGINIA 155, 162 (1733).
59. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83 (1789) (United States
courts have the power to "impose and administer all necessary oaths or affirmations");
ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 88 ("examination of witnesses in open court" governed by
the common law; every person making a deposition "shall be • • . sworn or affirmed to testify the whole truth"). See also An Act to Authorize Certain Officers
and other persons to Administer Oaths, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 554 (1798) (granting
power "to administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses, in any case under their examination"); An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States,
ch. 9, § 18, 1 Stat. 116 (1790) (perjury on "oath or affirmation"); An Act to Regulate Collection of Duties on Imports and Tonnage, ch. 22, § 96, 1 Stat. 699 (1799)
"that whenever an oath is required by this act, persons conscientiously scrupulous
shall be permitted to affirm").
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The few early decisions rendered in the United States concerning
affirmation of witnesses restricted its use to members of recognized
religious societies, such as the Quakers, that professed conscientious
scruples against taking the oath. 60 The confines of this rule are illustrated by a pair of federal cases involving one Daniel Kurtz. Summoned as a witness in Bank of Columbia v. Wright, 61 Kurtz-although
not officially a member of the Society of Friends (Quakers)espoused conscientious scruples against taking the oath. The Wright
court did not permit him to affirm. Two years later, however, the
same Daniel Kurtz was called to testify in King v. Fearson. 62 This
time the court declared itself satisfied that Kurtz-whose application
for membership in the Quaker society was then pending-met the
qualifications of the stated rule, and thus allowed him to affirm.
As the nineteenth century progressed, several state legislatures
extended the privilege of affirming to other persons who could not
in good conscience be sworn. 63 In 1826, for example, Massachusetts enacted a statute providing that "any person [who] shall declare that he is conscientiously scrupulous of taking or subscribing
[the] oath . . . shall be permitted to affirm in a manner provided
by law for the denomination of Quakers. " 64 It must be emphasized that extension of the affirmation during this period did not
abrogate the established belief requirement. Affirmation, rather, enabled certain persons, otherwise competent to be sworn under the
common-law oath, to testify without violating their religious scruples. 65
Despite the general standard of witness competency, at least one
60. In addition to the cases discussed in the text infra, see M'Intire's Case, 16
F. Cas. 151 (C.C.D.C. 1803) (No. 8,824) (affirmation denied to a non-Quaker summoned to be sworn as a juror); Bryan's Case, 4 F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D.C. 1804) (No.
2,064) (affirmation denied to a Methodist juror since not shown that taking oaths
was contrary to Methodist doctrines).
61. 2 F. Cas. 647 (C.C.D.C. 1827) (No. 883).
62. 14 F. Cas. 520 (C.C.D.C. 1829) (No. 7,790).
63. E.g., MICH. REV. STAT., ch. 102, § 95 (1846). See also An Act for the relief
of persons who are scrupulous of taking an oath in the usual form, Act of Feb. 16,
1799, § 5, in ACTS OF THE TwENTY Tmru> GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY 479, 480 (1799); An Act for the Relief of such Persons, as conscientiously scruple the taking of an Oath in the common Form, Act of March 21, 1772,
1771-1772 Pa. Laws 267. Cf. A Law for the relief of persons conscientiously scrupulous to take an Oath in the common form, Laws of 1795, Territory of the United
States North-West of the Ohio, reprinted in THE LAws OF THE NoRTIIWEST TERRITORY
1788-1800, at 163 (T. Pease ed. 1925) (affirmation permitted for Quakers only).
64. "An Act in addition to 'an Act prescribing the mode of taking Depositions,
and administering Oaths and Affirmations'" 1825 Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 91, § 1.
65. As a result, statutes such as the Massachusetts enactment, cited in note 64
supra, also provided that the court could require evidence of a witness' sincerity and,
if not satisfied, could require the customary oath. See also Williamson v. Carroll,
16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 217 (1837) (a witness who has no conscientious objection to the
taking of the oath cannot be affirmed).
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mid-nineteenth century court declared that no person could be
rendered incompetent because of his religious beliefs. In Perry v.
Commonwealth, 66 the trial court had admitted the testimony of a witness who "did not believe that mankind would be rewarded and
punished in a future state of existence," believing rather "that offences will meet their punishment here." 67 In affirming, the General
Court of Virginia found it ironic that the persons most likely to
be disabled under the common-law standard were those whose
honesty forced them to admit their true convictions and thereby
suffer public humiliation. The court stated that incompetency
based on religious grounds would violate the state constitutional
provision guaranteeing that religious distinctions cannot lessen "civil
capabilities." 68 Courts in several other states eventually followed
the lead of the Perry decision, 69 and by 1882 a Kentucky court70
confidently announced that "[t]he unquestioned tendency of modern
legislation, as well as of judicial interpretation, is to the exclusion of
inquiry into religious belief as a test of the competency of a witness." 71
66. 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 632 (1846).
67. 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) at 633.
68. 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) at 644.
The constitutional argument asserted by the Perry court had previously been held
inapplicable to atheists in Robert Perry's Admr. v. Stewart, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 37
(1835), where the court determined that the constitutional protection of freedom of
worship did not preclude excluding the testimony of one who denied all modes of
worship. The same result was reached subsequent to Perry in Thurston v. Whitney,
56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 104 (1848), quoted in text at note 24 supra. An 1859 Massachusetts statute removed this restriction imposed on Massachusetts atheists. Mass.
Gen. Stat. ch. 131, § 12 (1859) ("every person not a believer in religion shall be
required to testify truly under the pains and penalties of perjury").
69. See Hronek v. People, 134 Ill. 139, 24 N.E. 861 (1890) (overturning
the rule of Central Military Tract R.R. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541 (1856)); Colter
v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. 284, 39 S.W. 576 (1897). But see State v. Levine, 109 N.J.L.
503, 162 A. 909 (1932) (removal of traditional disabilities the responsibility of the
legislature), declared overruled by statute in State v. Parmigiani, 65 NJ. 154, 15158, 320 A.2d 161, 163 (1974).
70. Bush v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 244, re11d. on other grounds, 107 U.S. 110
(1882). The atheist witness in this case was certified competent pursuant to a state
statute that permitted all persons to affirm in lieu of oath.
71. 80 Ky. at 248 (dictum). The court construed the Kentucky Constitution as
granting no legal preference to any particular belief. The court reasoned that "[t]o
proscribe or punish for religious or political opinions is of the essence of despotism."
80 Ky. at 250.
In the oft-cited case of Gantz v. State, 18 Ga. App. 154, 88 S.E. 993 (1916),
the witness had stated that he did not know where he would go when he died and
that he was not a Christian. He did admit, however, that he knew he would go to
the penitentiary if he lied under oath. The Georgia Court of Appeals allowed the
witness to affirm, holding that "[o]ur law does not require more than that a witness
shall understand the nature of the obligation of an oath and the legal consequences
which should follow its violation." 18 Ga. App. at 156, 88 S.E. at 994 (emphasis
added)., See also Gibson v. American Mut. Life Ins. Co., 37 N.Y. 580, 584 (1868)
(the effect of an atheist's disbelief upon his actions is "speculative entirely").
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Greenleaf, in explaining this manifest change from the common-law
rule, noted that
[p]rofessional and public opinion has come to see that whatever the efficacy of the oath may be for those upon whose religious
feelings it exerts an influence, the absolute exclusion from the witness stand of those who have scruples against taking it, or of those
on whose belief it has no binding effect, is both unjust and impolitic.
Accordingly, legislation has in most jurisdictions acted with the
purpose of removing these disadvantages.72

Most states presently have statutes providing that persons unable to
take the religious oath, for whatever reason, may testify under affirmation. 73
72. 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON TiiE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 370-A (16th ed.
1899).
Great Britain abolished all restrictions on the testimony of atheists in 1888. The
Oaths Act of 1888, 51 & 52 Viet., c. 46, §§ 1-3, provides that "[e]very person upon
objecting to being sworn, and stating, as the ground of such objection, either that he
has no religious belief, or that the taking of an oath is contrary to his religious belief, shall be permitted to make his solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath."
Id. § 1. See Regina v. Clark, [1962] All E.R. 428.
73. For a compilation of the various state provisions, see 6 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 18, § 1828 n.1.
However, in three states-Maryland, Arkansas, and North Carolina-the effect
of an individual's religious beliefs on his competency as a witness remains unsettled.
The Maryland Declaration of Rights states that no person shall be incompetent as
a witness or juror because of his religious beliefs, provided '·he believes in the existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person will be held morally accountable for his acts." Mo. CoNST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 36. This provision's treatment of jurors in criminal cases was held unconstitutional in Schowgurow
v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940). Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (declaring unconstitutional a companion article of Maryland Constitution that made belief in God a prerequisite for public office). See also Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 219 A.2d
378, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966) (extending Schowgurow to civil- cases). Although the Maryland courts have not definitively ruled on the competency of the
atheist as a witness, various authorities have stated that such witnesses are capable
of affirmation. See Jackson v. Garrity, 250 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Md. 1965, supp. opinion 1966); White v. State, 244 Md. 188, 192, 223 A.2d 259, 261-62 (1966) (dictum);
50 Mo. Am. GEN. OP. 64, 79-80 (1965).
The Arkansas Constitution provides that "[n]o person who denies the being of
a God shall . . . be competent to testify as a witness in any court." ARK. CoNsT.
art. 19, § 1, applied in Mueller v. Coffman, 132 Ark. 45, 200 S.W. 136 (1918).
However, in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Torcaso, mentioned above, this
language possesses doubtful vitality. Moreover, the newly enacted Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence apparently allow an atheist to affirm as a matter of statute.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (Supp. 1976).
In North Carolina, the state constitution and statutes neither prohibit testimony
from atheists nor specifically enable such persons to affirm. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 11-1 to -11, 12-3(5) (1969). Consequently, the restrictive common-law rule
articulated in Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. 25 (1856), still technically applies there. But
see State v. Beal, 199 N.C. 278, 302, 154 S.E. 604, 618 (1930) (dictum suggesting
that exclusion of atheists is constitutionally suspect under N.C. CoNST. art. I, §§ 13,
19); N.C.R. Crv. P. 43(d) (affirmation in lieu of oath). See generally Biggs, Religious Belief as Qualification of a Witness, 8 N.C.L. REv. 31 (1930).
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The question of atheist competency remained unresolved at the
federal level until 1950.74 In Gillars v. United States, 75 a witness was
admitted over objection despite his professed disbelief in the "God
of the Bible" and in rewards or punishments after death. 70 The witness nonetheless recognized "the right and duty society has to furnish
some means of being able to enforce members of its community to
speak the truth." 77 The District of Columbia Circuit noted that
under the early common iaw the witness would have clearly been
incompetent, but held nonetheless that belief in God was no longer required and that the mere affirmation of an atheist was sufficient to
satisfy the sworn testimony rule. 78 In so holding, the court relied on
then-rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which declared that the competency of witnesses was controlled "by the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in light of reason and experience." 79
Prior' federal statutes had anticipated the result in Gillars. As
early as 1873, the Rules of Construction governing what is now the
United States Code mandated that, wherever the terms appeared,
"oath" was to be defined to include "affirmation" and "sworn" to
Although the traditional rule regarding witness competency will probably not survive in these jurisdictions once the proper case presents itself for decision, less certainty exists about the vitality of the dubious practice, still allowed in some jurisdictions, that permits religious beliefs--or lack thereof-to be used to impeach the credibility of a witness. See 3A J. W1GMORE, supra note 18, § 936 & nn. 4-5; notes 29
& 47 supra. Evidence of the religious beliefs or opinions of a witness is not admissible in federal court for the purpose of impairing his credibility. FED. R. Evm.
610. See also United States v. Rabb, 394 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1968) (suggesting
use of affirmation to avoid prejudicial inquiry into the witness' membership in "unpopular" minority religion); Virgin Islands v. Peterson, 553 F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1977)
(evidence of particular religious belief inadmissible to enhance witness credibility
under rule 610).
74. In 1916, a district court, applying federal common law, had held that a witness who did not believe in an avenging God was incompetent. United States v. Miller, 236 F. 798, 799 (W.D. Wash. 1916). This decision was effectively overruled
two years later by the Ninth Circuit, which declared that federal law must yield to
the provisions of article I, section 11 of the Washington state constitution, guaranteeing freedom of religion. Louie Ding v. United States, 247 F. 12 (9th Cir. 1918).
75. 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
76. 182 F.2d at 969 & n.3.
77. 182 F.2d at 969- n.3.
78. 182 F.2d at 969-70. Whether Gillars marks the end of any religious test for
competency remains to be seen, given the recent suggestion by a Pennsylvania court
that a witness may be barred on the basis of religion if the tenets of his faith command him not to tell the truth. Commonwealth v. Chuck, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 612,
616, 323 A.2d 123, 126 (1974) (dictum) (Church of Satan).
79. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, 327 U.S. 852 (1946). Rule 26 was amended by the
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 3, 88 Stat. 1949, which deleted the language quoted in the text and provided that, effective July 1, 1975, the new Federal
Rules of Evidence shall govern, see note 8 supra. See generally Orfield, The Reform of Federal Criminal Evidence, 32 F.R.D. 121 (1963) (historical background
of rule 26).
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include "affirmed."80 A similar rule of construction is used in rule
43(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that
"[w]henever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof."81 Congress
finally struck the death knell of atheist incompetency when it enacted rule 603 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits any
form of affirmation for the witness that is "calculated to awaken his
conscience and impress his mind with his duty to testify [truthfully]." 82
At common law, "sworn testimony" symbolized a binding contract between a witness and his God, and the religious character
of this obligation provided the source of confidence invested in such
testimony by the courts. As the origins of the oath reveal, the requirement that all witnesses be sworn before testifying is rooted in
the apprehension of divine sanction. The common law regarded the
fear of an avenging God as indispensable security against the defects
inherent in human testimony and on this basis justified exclusion
from the witness stand of those not susceptible to it. 83 However,
now that belief in religious sanctions has been eliminated as a prerequisite to bearing witness in court, sworn testimony given under
80. An Act to revise and consolidate the statutes of the United States, Dec. 1,
1873, tit. I, ch. 1, ,§ 1, R.S. § 1 (1873). See Braum v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,
566 (1897). The original rules, as first enacted two years earlier, applied only to
those instances where the common law or a specific statute permitted affirmation in
lieu of oath. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. See also An Act
to establish a uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout the United States, ch. 176,
§ 48, 14 Stat. 540 (1867) ("oath" includes "affirmation"). The current rules are
codified at 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
The equivalence of "oath" and "affirmation" under 1 U.S.C. § 1 was upheld in
Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934). See Bilderback v. United States, 249 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 946
(1958) (indictment for perjury sufficient under 1 U.S.C. § 1 even though the crime
was committed under affirmation).
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(d). This particular provision survived the amendment
process that followed the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. See
note 79 supra. Although the "solemn" affirmation contemplated by rule 43{d) may
be more limited than that authorized by the broad language of Federal Rule of Evidence 603, the distinction, if any, does not appear to be significant. See Moore v.
United States, 348 U.S. 966 (1955) (per curiam) (no requirement under rule 43(d)
that the specific word "solemnly" be used in the affirmation); United States v.
Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1969) (oath or affirmation may be given in
any form that "impresses upon the mind of the witness the necessity of telling the
truth"). Should any dispute arise, the wide applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence to "civil actions and proceedings" presumably would settle the question. FED.
R. Evm. ll0l(b).
82. FED. R. EVID. 603. The Advisory Committee's Note emphasizes that "no
special verbal formula is required." Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 263
(1972).
Evidence of the religious beliefs or opinions of a witness is also inadmissible in
federal court for the purpose of impairing his credibility. See note 73 supra.
83. See text at notes 49-50 supra.
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the affirmation is not "sworn" at all in the traditional sense. 84 In
this way, the full emergence of affirmation has severely eroded the
rationale underlying the sworn testimony rule.
C.

Refusal To Be Sworn: The Contempt
Power and the Sworn Testimony Rule

The use of contempt sanctions against persons who refuse to be
sworn further evidences the demise of the traditional rationale for
the sworn testimony rule. 85 Under the doctrine that every citizen
owes a public duty to provide evidence when summoned, 86 the judiciary has long possessed the general power to compel recalcitrant
witnesses to testify. 87 Since under the sworn testimony rule a person cannot be permitted to testify until he makes his oath or affirmation, 88 courts have held that refusal to be sworn as a witness is likewise
in contempt of court. 80 Without such authority, a court obviously
84. See White, supra note 11, at 424; notes 15-24 supra and accompanying text.
85. Although a fairly wide variety of acts can be deemed as contumacious, the
essence of an action in contempt is the willful disobedience of an order of the court
that obstructs its lawful proceedings. See In re Allis, 531 F.2d 1391, 1392 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 900 (1977). The law of contempts has been termed
"inordinately sweeping and vague," Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 200 (1958)
(Black, J., dissenting), and "a classic wilderness of single instances,'' Note, Contempt
of Court and the Victimization of Witnesses, 25 Moo. L. REV. 723, 723 (1962). An
oft-quoted characterization is the statement by Professor Moskovitz that "Contempt
of Court is the proteus of the legal world, assuming an almost infinite diversity of
forms." Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM, L.
REV. 780,780 (1943).
86. The Supreme Court has termed this duty a "hornbook proposition." United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976). Accord, Hurtado v. United States,
410 U.S. 578, 589 (1973); Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 558 n.2 (1961);
United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680, 688 (8th Cir. 1970).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1975); O'Connell
v. United States, 40 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1930); United States v. Caton, 25 F. Cas.
350 (C.C.D.C. 1803) (No. 14,758); Holman v. Mayor of Austin, 34 Tex. 668, 672
(1871).
88. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
89. Evidence of this approach surfaces quite early. A classic example is Rex v.
Preston, 91 Eng. Rep. 243 (K.B. 1690) (nisi prius) (Holt, C.J.). In that case, the
court imprisoned one Lord Preston for refusing to be sworn "to give evidence to the
grand jury on an indictment for high treason." Chief Justice Holt termed the refusal
"a great contempt." 91 Eng. Rep. at 243. Accord, Hennegal v. Evance, 33 Eng.
Rep. 77 (Ch. 1806) (unsworn witness ordered to submit or "stand committed"), An
early instance of contempt in a federal court for refusal to be sworn is found in
United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858), involving a witness who refused to take the usual oath on the ground that he had a right
to affirm. The court denied him that privilege and ordered him imprisoned until the
witness indicated a readiness to submit. See Ex parte Stice, 70 Cal. 51, 11 P. 459
(1866) (witness who refused to be sworn imprisoned and fined; court held each refusal a separate contempt); Stanbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793) (contempt
for refusal to be sworn on the Sabbath). Modern courts have likewise invoked the
contempt sanction against witnesses who have refused to be sworn. E.g., People v.
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could not protect its inquiry from complete frustration. 00
A witness might refuse to be sworn or affirmed for several reasons.
Given the rule against unsworn testimony, one obvious motive would
be the desire of a witness to delay or avoid testifying. Some individuals may instead have conscientious scruples against making affirmations or promises of any sort. 91 Finally, refusing to be sworn may
be a symbolic act of noncooperation with what the witness considers
an unjust or oppressive legal system. 92 Without distinguishing
among such individual propensities, however, most jurisdictions
presently declare that refusals to be sworn are contemptc; as a matter
of express statute. 93 When confronted with disobedience by the
unsworn witness, the courts have been generally empowered either to
punish the witness by fine or imprisonment ( criminal contempt) 94
Chandler, 17 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803, 95 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (1971); People v. Clark,
4 Ill. App. 3d, 301, 280 N.E.2d 723 (1972).
One exception appears in the unusual case of Commercial Bank of Scotland v.
Lloyd's Gen. Italian Assur. Co., 2 T.L.R. 780 (Q.B. 1886). In that case, the plaintiff
had sued upon a marine assurance policy, and had summoned the captain of the vessel involved in the dispute. The suit dragged on for several years, and when the captain was finally called he refused to be sworn "until he was paid for having been
kept here in England awaiting this trial for two-and-a-half years." 2 T.L.R. at 780.
The court, under the circumstances, failed to find the witness in contempt, and it
never recalled him because he steadfastly refused all offers below the £ 450 figure
he had set for his estimated expenses.
90. See Commonwealth ex rel Rauthon v. Roberts, 4 Pa. L.J. 126, 131 (D.C.
Lancaster 1841) (witness who refused to be sworn "would unquestionably be guilty
of misbehavior and thereby obstruct the administration of justice").
91. See Biklen v. Board of Educ., 333 F. Supp. 902, 906 (N.D.N.Y. 1971), affd.,
406 U.S. 951 (1972) (refusal to take loyalty oath based on, inter alia, convictions
excluding any form of affirmation as well as oath); In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68,
162 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967) (refusal to be sworn on the ground
that to testify would violate witness' freedom of religion). See also United States
v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38, 51 (2d Cir. 1973) (refusal to testify because Jewish law prohibited testimony by a Jew against a Jew in a non-Jewish court).
92. See Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (refusal to be
sworn at an executive session of the House Committee on Un-American Activities).
See also United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974) (refusal to rise in
a federal courtroom as a matter of personal conscience), discussed in 53 TEXAS L.
RBv. 1321 (1975).
93. E.g., ALASKA SrAT. § 09.50.010(10) (1976); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-1823
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.,§§ 28-512, 34-901 (1962); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1209
(9) (West 1972 & Supp. 1977), § 1991 (West 1955); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 166 (West
1970); DEL. CoDE tit. 11, § 1271(4) (1974); LA. CoDE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 222(5)
(West 1960); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 21(4) (West 1967); MICH. CoMP.
LAws § 600.1701(7)(a), .1701(7)(e) (1970); MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 588.20(6) (West
1976 & Supp. 1977); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-1-17 (1972); Mo. SrAT. ANN. § 476.110(5)
(Vernon 1952); N.Y. Jun. LAw §§ 750(A)(5), 753(A)(5) (McKinney 1975); N.Y.
PENAL LAw §§ 215.50(4), .51 (McKinney 1975); Omo RBv. CoDB ANN. § 2705.02
(C) (Page 1953); VA. CoDB § 8-303 (1957).
94. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218 (West 1972) (maximum $500 fine and
five days imprisonment); CAL. PENAL CoDB § 166 (West 1970) (criminal proceedings only: maximum $500 fine and six months imprisonment).
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or to coerce compliance by imprisoning the offender until he will be
sworn ( civil contempt). 95 Whether the particular refusal constitutes
a "criminal" or "civil" contempt depends not on the nature of the
contemptuous act itself, but rather upon the specific purpose sought
by the court in imposing the sanction. 96
No federal contempt legislation exists that is expressly directed
against the refusal to be sworn. Two statutes could be used, however, to authorize exercising the contempt power in such situations.
The first, 18 U.S.C. § 401,97 grants a federal court broad discretion
to punish "by fine or imprisonment" 98 an obstruction of justice in
or near the court's presence99 or any disobedience to its lawful command.100 On the theory that a refusal to be sworn obstructs the proceedings, this conduct would constitute a criminal contempt. 101 The
95. E.g., CAL. av. PRoc. CooE § 1219 (West 1972) (imprisonment until performance); CAL. PENAL CooE § 1331 (West 1970).
96. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74-75 (1957), modified, 356 U.S.
363 ( 1958) (same act may constitute both civil and criminal contempt); United
States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 298-99 (1947) ("same acts may justify a court in resorting to coercive and to punitive measures"); Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 533 F.2d 344, 348-49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. City of Chicago v. Shakman, 429 U.S. 858 (1976) (depends on nature of relief asked and purpose of that
relief).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). For a discussion of the legislative history and the
criminal contempt roots of the statute, see 65 MICH, L. REV. 1490 (1967).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). The Fourth Circuit has recently interpreted this
phrase to mean that a court may punish a criminal contempt by fine or imprisonment, but not by both. United States ex rel. Kanawha Coal Operators Assn. v.
Miller, 540 F.2d 1213, 1214 (4th Cir. 1976).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1970). When the act is committed in the actual presence of the court (commonly termed a "direct" contempt}, the court may summarily
punish the offender. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). Such punishment, imposed without prior notice or hearing and without the right to a jury trial, has been attacked
by the commentators as an unconstitutional violation of due process. See Goldfarb,
The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 MICH. L. REv. 283 (1962); Sedler, The
Summary Contempt Power and the Constitution: The View from Without and
Within, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 34 (1976); Note, Contempt of Court: Go Directly to Jail.
Do Not Pass Go. Do Not Collect Your Constitutional Rights, 1 SUFFOLK U.L. REV,
517 (1973).
The Supreme Court has nonetheless recently upheld the propriety of summary
punishment for those contempts committed in the court's presence. United States
v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975). That case involved two witnesses who had politely
refused to testify on behalf of the government even though each had been granted
immunity. Chief Justice Burger for the Court stated that summary punishment must
be available to "vindicate the authority of the court as well as to provide the recalcitrant witness with some incentive to testify." 421 U.S. at 316. The Chief Justice
found that obstruction of an ongoing trial was the key justification for the summary
contempt power. 421 U.S. at 318. To the extent that refusal to be sworn can be
characterized as an obstruction, see notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text, it
seems clear that a witness who will not take the oath can be subjected to summary
punishment under this rationale. See the discussion of United States v. Wilson in
13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 271 (1975).
100. 18 u.s.c. § 401 (3 ).
101. See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text; note 99 supra.
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second statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1826, empowers the court to confine any
witness who "refuses without just cause . . . to testify or provide
other information . . . until such time as the witness is willing to
[comply]."1102 This statute appears to apply derivatively to a
witness who refuses to be sworn, since that conduct may be seen
as one manner of refusing to testify. 103
Use of the contempt power by the courts forces formal compliance with the sworn testimony rule, but this sanction is clearly not
consistent with the rule's objective. Through the oath, the law at
least seeks to "awaken the conscience"104 of the witness in order to
enhance the probability that he will tell the truth. In cases in which
a witness makes clear his refusal to be bound by the oath, however,
compelling him to be sworn forces a fiction upon the doctrine that
Even if § 401 were not applicable, common-law authority exists for the application of the federal contempt power. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d
372, 373-74 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). Moreover, the District Court for the District of Columbia has held a government witness in contempt for refusal to be sworn,
without any apparent reliance on statutory authority. Coppedge v. United States, 272
F.2d 504, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See United States v. Harding, 237 F. Supp. 317,
317 n.3. (D. Conn. 1964) (similar result).
102. 28 U.S.C. ,§ 1826 (1970) (maximum 18-month confinement). See also 28
U.S.C. § 1782 (1970) (power to compel testimony for use in foreign or international
tribunal).
103. It might be argued that "refusing . . . to testify" cannot be expanded to embrace the separate act of refusing to be sworn prior to testifying. For example, a
witness with conscientious scruples against being "sworn" may be perfectly willing
to "testify" before the court. Further, Congress could easily have expressly provided
contempt sanctions for refusal to be sworn. See FED. -R. Crv. P. 37,(b)(l) ("refus[al] to be sworn or to answer a question" constitutes contempt in discovery proceedings) (emphasis added). Numerous state legislatures have explicitly declared
the refusal to be sworn to be a separate offense. See note 93 supra.
Such a literal reading of § 1826 may be attacked on several grounds. The legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress sought "to codify the civil contempt aspect of present law as it applies . . . in the area of the refusal to give re- quired testimony," on the principle that "the public has a right to every man's evidence." 116 CONG. REc. 18921 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (citing Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961) ). See S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 148 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 46
( 1970). As demonstrated earlier, the common law of civil contempts at the time of
the enactment of this statute clearly encompassed the refusal to be sworn. See notes
89-90 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, on the strength of statutory language
similar to that of § 1826, the Congress has customarily utilized its civil contempt
powers in dealing with witnesses who have refused to be sworn before its own committees. See 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970); Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 280
(D.C. Cir. 1948). See also United States v. Josephson, 74 F. Supp. 958, 959 (S.D.
N.Y.), affd., 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948). Finally,
the force of the provision would be eviscerated by an interpretation that proscribed
the refusal to testify but did not reach a prior act by which the witness might willfully render himself wholly incompetenL See State v. Salafia, 29 Conn. Supp. 305,
310, 284 A.2d 576, 579 (1971), where the court reasoned that the power to compel
testimony implied the power to require the witness to be sworn, since testimony is
commonly defined as the making of oral statements under oath.
104. FED. R. Evm. 603, discussed in note 8 supra.
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the oath must affect the mind and emotions of the witness. On
balance, the fundamental need of the courts to secure testimony will
prevail over the refusal of individual witnesses to be sworn. Nonetheless, it should be recognized that testimony is obtained under this
system at the expense of renouncing the security of that moral obligation upon which the oath has traditionally relied for its raison
d'etre. 105
D.

Minimal Standard of Witness Competency

That the courts are willing to accept testimony under a forced
oath comports with the modem movement favoring admissibility of
all relevant evidence. The blanket incompetencies once imposed
upon atheists and other classes of potential witnesses have been
almost completely eliminated in the wake of this trend. 100 As the
Supreme Court has declared, it is "the conviction of our time that
the truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony
of all persons of competent understanding . . . leaving the credit
.and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by
the court. "107 In the federal courts, this trend has been given effect
through Federal Rule of Evidence 601,108 which legislates the
abandonment of such traditional incapacities as religious opinion,
party interest, conviction of a crime, and mental defect. 100 The
emerging maxim that such factors should affect only witness credibility has produced a de minimis standard of witness competency that
has ·significant implications for the traditional justification for the
sworn testimony rule.
A prime example of the application of this de minimis standard
is found in United States v. HicksY 0 In that case, the witness, the
wife of the defendant, admitted that she was being supported by a
105. Moral constraints are similarly ignored when the waiver doctrine is employed to admit inadvertently unswom testimony. See note 9 supra.
106. See Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEO, WASH, L.
REV. 53, 53-54 (1965).
107. Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918). In that case the Court
abolished the common-law incompetency of convicts in federal court. The former
rule is discussed in 2 J. WIGMORB, supra note 7, §§ 519-24.
108. FED. R. Evm. 601.
109. The rule was described by the Advisory Committee as a "general groundclearing." Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 601.
The committee continued with the statement that, with the exception of the so-called
Dead Man's Statutes, "American jurisdictions generally have ceased to recognize
these (various) grounds." Id. Professor Rothstein has termed this bias toward admissibility "the predominent theme" of the federal rules. Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 246 (1974) (statement of Prof. Paul F. Rothstein).
110. 389 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 970 (1968).
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man who had earlier shot her husband, that she had written the defendant "that she hated him and wanted revenge," that she was
jealous of a woman with whom the defendant was "friendly," and
that she used narcotics and "heard voices." Despite these admissions, the court declared itself satisfied of her competency merely
because she indicated an appreciation of her obligation to tell the
truth, and consequently the court allowed her to testify. In other
applications of this de minimis standard, courts have certified the
competency of narcotics addicts, 111 unindicted or unsentenced coconspirators and accomplices, 112 paid informers, 113 perjurers,114 and
other persons of questionable integrity. 115 In Poindexter v. Wolff, 116
the witness was sworn even though he faced a death sentence
111. United States v. Van Meerbeke, 548 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 974 (1977) (no reversible error where government witness ingested opium
while testifying in opium importation prosecution). See United States v. Killian, 524
F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. :1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976) (witness competent
despite "occasional hallucinations"); Virgin Islands v. Hendricks, 476 F.2d 776 (3d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Parker, 428 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
910 (1970).
112. See United States v. Pacelli, 521 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 911 (1976) (admitted perjurer and accomplice, self-described as a "violent, vindictive, warped-minded cynic of a magnitude that you have absolutely no
conception of," allowed to testify); Lemons v. United States, 339 F.2d 761 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965) (witness had pleaded guilty to related
charge); United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (unindicted
accomplice and admitted perjurer allowed to testify). See Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967) (co-indictee allowed to testify). Cf. Paderick v. Boone, 541 F.2d
447 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977) (new trial since fact that
accomplice was granted immunity in exchange for testifying not disclosed to jury).
113. United States v. Smith, 343 F.2d 847, 850 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
824 (1965) (informer promised "benefits" for his cooperation). Cf. United States
v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (special danger that narcotics addicts who are paid informers will lie).
114. United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
995 (1975) (admitted perjurer); United States v. Greenberg, 419 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.
1969) (suggesting different standard for testimony of convicted perjurer).
115. In United States v. Peller, 151 F. Supp. 242, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), a witness, who had a serious criminal record and underworld connections, was described
as "utterly unreliable, unworthy of belief, and representing the almost absolute zero
of credibility." Nonetheless, the court deemed the witness to be competent and permitted him take the oath as a prelude to his testimony. See Singleton v. United
States, 381 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1024 (1967) ("gravely unstable" and "depraved" prostitute allowed to testify); State v. Brom, 8 Or. App. 598,
494 P.2d 434 (1972) (witness required aid of hypnosis and sodium amytal in order
to remember the events in question).
In Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87 (6th Cir.), stay of execution granted,
318 U.S. 746, cert. denied, 318 U.S. 781, leave to appeal denied and stay vacated,
319 U.S. 423 (per curiam), rehearing denied, 319 U.S. 783 (1943), a wartime trial
for treason against the United States, a German army officer "imbued with Naziism,"
who appeared in full-dress uniform and gave the Nazi salute, was permitted to testify
as a witness.
116. 403 F. Supp. 723 (D. Neb. 1975), affd., 540 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam),
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for his complicity in a bombing and had struck a plea bargain
in exchange for testimony against a co-conspirator. A narcotics
addict was recently sworn as a witness in United States v. Harris, 111
even though he was under the influence of drugs, did not know
whether the month was "January or February," and was observed
to be ''bouncing or nodding" during his entire testimony.118
In such decisions, the courts have abandoned an independent
concern for the probable integrity of the testimony, leaving that issue
to the jury. 119 The modern policy of witness competency avoids the
constraints of the sworn testimony rule by assuming that every person is competent to be sworn. 120 Although in some instances the
oath may have a profound impact on the witness, 121 on the whole
its effect will thus inevitably be as diverse as the individual characters
of those being sworn. In the cases noted above, 122 it is difficult to
imagine that the oath "awakened the consciences" of the witnesses
in any meaningful fashion before they testified. That these persons
were permitted to testify nonetheless stands as evidence that under
present standards the "highest security" and "sanctity" of the oath
are more mythical than real.
IJ.

THE LAST STAND OF THE SwoRN TESTIMONY RULE:
THE OATH AND THE CRIME OF PERJURY

As an adjunct to divine punishment, for centuries the common
law has insisted that witnesses incur legal penalties for their untruths.123 Both sanctions were invoked by the same oath, and absent
the oath the witness was liable under neither. 124 The force of the
117. 542 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1976).
118. 542 F.2d at 1303.
119. E.g., United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). This shift has necessitated cautionary instructions to
the jury where the unreliability of the witness is especially acute. See Paderick v.
Boone, 541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977), discussed
in note 112 supra; United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566, 572 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(failure to caution reversible error), discussed in note 113 supra.
120. Compare the assumptions underlying the common-law doctrine, notes 10-24
supra and accompanying text.
121. See text at notes 136-38 infra.
122. See notes 110-18 supra and accompanying text.
123. In the earliest period of the common law, the doctrine of judicium dei, see
text at notes 15-18 supra, made mere civil penalties insignificant and unnecessary.
Apparently this attitude changed as the possibility of divine intervention became less
certain in legal minds. A superb history of the law of perjury is given in Recommendations and Report to the Legislature on Perjury, in LA.w REVISION CoMMISSION,
STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE l.A.W REVISION COMMISSION 227, 235-54
(1935) [hereinafter cited as LAw REVISION CoMMISSION], See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137-38; Comment, Perjury: The Forgotten Offense, 65 J,
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 361, 361-63 (1974):
124. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 238 •(1835); Rex v. Ay-
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religious sanction in modem society is in doubt, but, in all jurisdictions, statutes clearly indicate that the crime of perjury125 remains dependent on the oath or affirmation. 126 One example of the rule that
the oath is generally a condition precedent to perjury is the federal
statute providing that "[w]hoever, having taken an oath before
a competent tribunal . . . that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, . . . willfully and contrary to such oath states . . . any
material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of per-

jury.»121

Whether the oath should be an essential element of the crime
is questionable. The act of lying, regardless of whether the witness
is sworn, could itself be punished. This reform has been adopted
in legislation governing certain instances where administration of an
oath would prove inconvenient or financially burdensome.128 Most
significantly, the federal perjury statute129 was recently amended130
to permit the use in court of certain unswom declarations.
lett, 99 Eng. Rep. 973, 976 (K.B. 1785). The civil penalties for perjury alone were
considered insufficient security for a person's truthfulness. See note 23 supra.
125. For the purposes of this Note, "perjury" is defined narrowly as the deliberate
giving of false oral testimony in court by a contending party or his witness. See JusTICE, supra note 3, 1T 1.
126. E.g., ALA. Com, tit. 14, §§ 375-377 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 11.30.010
(1970); CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 (West 1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-2
(Smith-Hurd 1973); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 268, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); VA.
CODE § 18.2-434 (1975); The Perjury Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 6, § 1 (19ll).
The Model Penal Code provides: "A person is guilty of perjury . . . if in any official
proceeding he makes a false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears
or affirms the truth- of a statement previously made, when . . . he does not believe
it to be true." MODEL PENAL CODE§ 241.1(1) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970). These requirements have changed little from the
original 1790 federal statute, see An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes
against the United States, ch. 9, § 18, 1 Stat. 116 (1790), and are strikingly similar
to past expressions of the common-law rule, see 3 E. CoKB, supra note 21, at 164.
In applying this provision, the courts have clearly indicated that the administration of the oath or affirmation is a prerequisiJe to a conviction for perjury. See
United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1958); United States v. Debrow, 346
U.S. 374 (1953) (dictum) (oath an essential element of the crime); United States
v. Howard, 132 F. 325 (W.D. Tenn. 1904) (indictment must aver that witness was
sworn).
128. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970), which makes it a criminal offense to
give "any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations" in any matter
within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States; I.R.C. §
7206(1), which imposes a maximum punishment of three years imprisonment and a
$5,000 fine for any false statement verified by an unswom written declaration that
it is made under the penalty for perjury. The specific application of 18 U.S.C. §
1001 to false statements made to federal law enforcement officials has been critically
discussed in Note, Criminal Liability for False Statements to Federal Law Enforcement Officials, 63 VA. L REv. 451 (1977). See also MODEL PENAL CoDE § 241.3
(Prop. Official Draft 1962) ( criminal sanctions for unswom written statement made
"with [the] purpose to mislead a public servant in performing his official function").
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970), 9uoted in text at note 127 supra.
130. Act of Oct. 18, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-550, §§ 1-2, 90 Stat. 2534. This Act
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Moreover, whether the threat of criminal punishment invoked by
the oath actually deters perjury is open to question. Theoretically,
the formality of the oath places a witness on notice of his potential
criminal liability. Accepting this premise, a plurality of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Mandujano 131 recently stated that "'[o]nce
a witness swears to give truthful answers, there is no requirement
to "warn him not to commit perjury or, conversely to direct him to
tell the truth."' " 132 Yet perjury is an extremely common offense
that is ineffectively reached by any sanction and is rarely prosecuted. 133
Moreover, it has been suggested that, "as general standards of
honesty and respect for the authority and effectiveness of the law
decline, the incidence of perjury is likely to increase."134
Perhaps the high incidence of perjury is due to the unsalvageably
corrupt nature of man. It is more likely, however, that the prospect
of supernatural punishment or criminal prosecution is outweighed
by more personal concerns: fear of public embarrassment at disclosure of the truth, threats against one's person or property, financial
self-interest, loyalty to one of the parties, the opportunity for personal
revenge against an adversary, or the need to conceal other crimes.
In any case, the oath may have no significant independent effect upon
the truthfulness of individual witnesses. Given these circumstances,
it is not surprising that Chief Justice Burger concluded in Mandujano
that, in the absence of criminal penalties for perjury, "even the
solemnity of the oath . . . cannot insure truthful answers." 135
added a new section (§ 1746) to title 28 of the United States Code that generally
authorizes "the use of unsworn statements subscribed to under penalty of perjury."
See H.R. REP. No. 1616, 94th Cong., 2d Sess .. 2 (1976), reprinted in [1976) U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 5644, 5645. Section 2 of the Act amended 18 U.S.C. §
1621 to provide that any person who "in any declaration, certificate, verification, or
statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United
States Code, wilfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe
to be true; is guilty of perjury." 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2) (Supp. 1977).
The purpose of new § 1746 is to expedite the verification of certain documents
after business hours and the procurement of declarations from outside the United
States. H.R. REP. No. 1616, supra, at 1. Depositions or any statements required
to be signed before a specified official other than a notary public are not eligible for
§ 1746 treatment. See H.R. REP. No. 161, supra at 2.
131. 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
132. 425 U.S. at 581-82 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (emphasis original) (quoting
United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 1965)). Of course, it is not
improper for the court to caution a suspect witness about the penalties for perjury.
See United States v. Vosper, 493 F.2d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 1974).
133. See JusncE, supra note 3, ,r 2; LAw REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 123,
at 235; Purrington, The Frequency of Perjury, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 67, 70 (1908)
("pains and penalties so rarely inflicted as to have become the 'rumble of a distant
drum'"); Comment, supra note 123, at 361 (citing REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusncE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SoclE1Y 374 (1968) ),
134. JusncE, supra note 3, ,r 2.
135. 425 U.S. at 576.
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CONCLUSION

The oath remains an icon in the law: a symbol to the witness
of duty demanded. Yet the devout society that gave birth to and
nurtured the firm religious foundation of the sworn testimony rule
no longer exists, and, with that passing, members of the legal profession must take stock of the legacy bequeathed to present generations.
Several commentators have advanced that notion that, despite
the erosion of its fundamental religious force, the oath continues to
be an important institution. Wigmore maintained that many witnesses may still be influenced by the oath's religious connotations. 136
Others have suggested that "mental anguish" 137 induced by the .oath
may be an incentive for truthful testimony, and that the ritual offers
the witness an opportunity to gain a sense of respectability and selfsatisfaction by conforming to the social expectation that only the
truth should be spoken in a court of law. 138 Our examination of
the affirmation and the relationships between the oath and the law
of contempts and of perjury, however, contends for the proposition
that the ancient institution of the oath has been reduced to a mere
technicality of the perjury statutes. It is certain that, in an age of
almost universal competency and broad admissibility of evidence, the
sworn testimony rule no longer embodies the "highest' possible security which men in general can give for the truth of their statements." 139
The state of the sworn testimony rule does not necessarily counsel for its complete abandonment. The solemn swearing of a particular witness may imperceptibly benefit the law in its search for
the truth, and the practice remains curiously engrained in the legal
psyche. Yet the oath is largely an historical artifact: to borrow
Justice Holmes' oft-quoted phrase, to a significant extent "the
grounds upon which [the traditional rule] was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past."140 This being the case, the deep and uncritical confidence placed in the sworn nature of testimony cannot longer be justified.
136. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1827.
137. See United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1407 n.2 (1969).
138. Sorenson, The Effectiveness of the Oath To Obtain a Witness' True Personal
Opinion, 41 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 284, 286 (1956).
139. R. WlllTCOMBE, supra note 6, at 39 (emphasis original).
140. O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).

